Includes index.

1790: Secretary Jefferson and the foreign affairs power -- 1791: the National Bank and the point of interpretation -- 1793: the Supreme Court and the metaphysics of sovereignty -- 1794: Kamper v. Hawkins and the role of the judiciary -- 1798 (1): Justice Paterson and the missing fundamental principle -- 1798 (2): how to think about the Sedition Act -- 1800: Marshall and the role of the political branches -- 1802: how not to think about the Judiciary Repeal Act -- 1804: Turpin v. Locket and the place of religion -- 1806: Hudgins v. Wright and the place of slavery -- 1808-1809: a forgotten crossroads in constitutional history -- -- 1817: President Madison vetoes his own bill -- 1818: the Congress thinks about internal improvements -- 1821: the Attorney General and the rule of law -- 1829: writing State v. Mann -- 1859: the Supreme Court and the metaphysics of supremacy -- 1862: four attorneys general and the meaning of citizenship -- 1873: Slaughterhouse revisited -- 1904: Clay May, the railroad, and Justice Holmes -- 1927: Justice Brandeis and the final end of the state -- 1944: constitutional injustice -- 2002: common ground after two centuries.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

H. Jefferson Powell offers a powerful new approach to one of the central issues in American constitutional thinking today: the problem of constitutional law's historicity, or the many ways in which constitutional arguments and outcomes are shaped both by historical circumstances and by the political goals and commitments of various actors, including judges. The presence of such influences is often considered highly problematic: if constitutional law is political and historical through and through, then what differentiates it from politics per se, and what gives it integrity and coherence? Powe.

Description based on print version record.