Frontmatter -- Preface -- Inhalt -- Introduction -- 1 What is conceptual analysis and what is the problem? -- 2 Two-dimensionalism and the necessary a posteriori -- 3 The challenge from the epistemic arguments -- 4 Primary intensions, defining the subject, and communication -- 5 Epistemic transparency and epistemic opacity -- 6 Scrutability, primary intensions, and conceptual analysis -- 7 The trouble with definitions and the aims of conceptual analysis -- 8 Concluding remarks -- References

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According to epistemic two-dimensionalism, or simply twodimensionalism, linguistic expressions are associated with two intensions, one of which represents an expression's a priori implications. The author investigates the prospects of conceptual analysis on the basis of a twodimensionalist theory of meaning. He discusses a number of arguments for and against two-dimensional semantics and argues that properly construed, two-dimensionalism provides a potent and plausible account of meaning. Against the background of this account, the author then goes on to assess the value of conceptual analysis in philosophical practice, outlining ist goals, ist promises, but also ist limitations.

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In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 15. Jun 2019)