Measuring judicial independence
Ramseyer, J. Mark, 1954-
Measuring judicial independence the political economy of judging in Japan / [electronic resource] : J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen. - University of Chicago Press, 2003. - 1 online resource (xii, 201 p.) : ill. ;24 cm. - Studies in law and economics . - Studies in law and economics (Chicago, Ill.) .
Includes bibliographical references (p. 187-196) and index.
Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction: 1968; 1. The Setting; 2. Preliminary Empirics: Methodology and Communist Judges; 3. The Effect of Judicial Decisions: Anti-Government Opinions and Electoral Law Disputes; 4. Political Disputes: Military, Malapportionment, Injunctions, and Constitutional Law; 5. Administrative Disputes: Taxpayers against the Government; 6. Criminal Cases: Suspects against the Government; 7. Toward a Party-Alternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence; 8. Conclusions; Appendixes; References; Index.
The role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions--asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be "independent in the exercise of.
9780226703879 (electronic bk.) 0226703878 (electronic bk.)
Judges--Japan.
Judicial process--Japan.
Political questions and judicial power--Japan.
Courts--Japan.
Juges--Japon.
Processus judiciaire--Japon.
Politique et pouvoir judiciaire--Japon.
Tribunaux--Japon.
POLITICAL SCIENCE--Government--Judicial Branch.
LAW--Legal Services.
LAW--Civil Procedure.
Rechtspraak.
Rechterlijke organisatie.
Onafhankelijkheid (algemeen)
Electronic books.
KNX1610 / .R36 2003eb
347.52/014
Measuring judicial independence the political economy of judging in Japan / [electronic resource] : J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen. - University of Chicago Press, 2003. - 1 online resource (xii, 201 p.) : ill. ;24 cm. - Studies in law and economics . - Studies in law and economics (Chicago, Ill.) .
Includes bibliographical references (p. 187-196) and index.
Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction: 1968; 1. The Setting; 2. Preliminary Empirics: Methodology and Communist Judges; 3. The Effect of Judicial Decisions: Anti-Government Opinions and Electoral Law Disputes; 4. Political Disputes: Military, Malapportionment, Injunctions, and Constitutional Law; 5. Administrative Disputes: Taxpayers against the Government; 6. Criminal Cases: Suspects against the Government; 7. Toward a Party-Alternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence; 8. Conclusions; Appendixes; References; Index.
The role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions--asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be "independent in the exercise of.
9780226703879 (electronic bk.) 0226703878 (electronic bk.)
Judges--Japan.
Judicial process--Japan.
Political questions and judicial power--Japan.
Courts--Japan.
Juges--Japon.
Processus judiciaire--Japon.
Politique et pouvoir judiciaire--Japon.
Tribunaux--Japon.
POLITICAL SCIENCE--Government--Judicial Branch.
LAW--Legal Services.
LAW--Civil Procedure.
Rechtspraak.
Rechterlijke organisatie.
Onafhankelijkheid (algemeen)
Electronic books.
KNX1610 / .R36 2003eb
347.52/014