The biology and psychology of moral agency / William A. Rottschaefer.
Material type:
TextSeries: Cambridge studies in philosophy and biologyPublisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1998Description: 1 online resource (xi, 293 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)Content type: - text
- computer
- online resource
- 9780511527357 (ebook)
- The Biology & Psychology of Moral Agency
- 171/.7 21
- BJ1311 .R68 1998
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Understanding moral agency : What is a scientific naturalistic view of moral agency? -- Evolution and morality : Can evolution endow us with moral capacities? -- Evolution and moral agency : Does evolution endow us with moral capacities? -- Developmentally based moral capacities : How does the moral sense develop? -- Behaviorally based moral capacities : How do we learn to behave morally? -- The social cognitive bases of morality : How do we learn to act morally? -- The neurophysiological bases of moral capacities : Does neurophysiology have room for moral agents? -- The adequacy of moral beliefs, motivations, and actions : How can biological and psychological explanations serve as justifications? -- Moral ontology : What is the ontological status of moral values? -- The manifest and scientific images of morality : How can we integrate our ordinary and scientifically based views of moral agency?
This important book brings findings and theories in biology and psychology to bear on the fundamental question in ethics of what it means to behave morally. It explains how we acquire and put to work our capacities to act morally and how these capacities are reliable means to achieving true moral beliefs, proper moral motivations, and successful moral actions. By presenting a complete model of moral agency based on contemporary evolutionary theory, developmental biology and psychology, and social cognitive theory, the book offers a unique perspective. It will be read with profit by a broad swathe of philosophers, as well as psychologists and biologists.
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