TY  - BOOK
AU  - Taylor,Alan D.
ED  - Mathematical Association of America,
TI  - Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation
T2  - Outlooks
SN  - 9780511614316 (ebook)
AV  - JF1001 .T39 2005
U1  - 324.6/01/5193 22
PY  - 2005///
CY  - Cambridge
PB  - Cambridge University Press
KW  - Voting
KW  - Mathematical models
KW  - Social choice
KW  - Political science
KW  - Game theory
N1  - Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
N2  - Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This 2005 book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614316
ER  -