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Measuring judicial independence [electronic resource] : the political economy of judging in Japan / J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Studies in law and economics (Chicago, Ill.)Publication details: Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2003.Description: 1 online resource (xii, 201 p.) : ill. ;24 cmISBN:
  • 9780226703879 (electronic bk.)
  • 0226703878 (electronic bk.)
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Measuring judicial independence.DDC classification:
  • 347.52/014 22
LOC classification:
  • KNX1610 .R36 2003eb
Online resources:
Contents:
Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction: 1968; 1. The Setting; 2. Preliminary Empirics: Methodology and Communist Judges; 3. The Effect of Judicial Decisions: Anti-Government Opinions and Electoral Law Disputes; 4. Political Disputes: Military, Malapportionment, Injunctions, and Constitutional Law; 5. Administrative Disputes: Taxpayers against the Government; 6. Criminal Cases: Suspects against the Government; 7. Toward a Party-Alternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence; 8. Conclusions; Appendixes; References; Index.
Summary: The role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions--asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be "independent in the exercise of.
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ელ.რესურსი ელ.რესურსი ეროვნული სამეცნიერო ბიბლიოთეკა 1 Link to resource Available

Includes bibliographical references (p. 187-196) and index.

Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction: 1968; 1. The Setting; 2. Preliminary Empirics: Methodology and Communist Judges; 3. The Effect of Judicial Decisions: Anti-Government Opinions and Electoral Law Disputes; 4. Political Disputes: Military, Malapportionment, Injunctions, and Constitutional Law; 5. Administrative Disputes: Taxpayers against the Government; 6. Criminal Cases: Suspects against the Government; 7. Toward a Party-Alternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence; 8. Conclusions; Appendixes; References; Index.

The role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions--asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be "independent in the exercise of.

Description based on print version record.

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