000			02509nam a22004098i 4500
001			CR9780511614316
003			UkCbUP
005			20200124160224.0
006			m|||||o||d||||||||
007			cr||||||||||||
008			090914s2005||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9780511614316 (ebook)
020			_z9780521810524 (hardback)
020			_z9780521008839 (paperback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP
050	0	0	_aJF1001 _b.T39 2005
082	0	0	_a324.6/01/5193 _222
100	1		_aTaylor, Alan D., _d1947- _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aSocial choice and the mathematics of manipulation / _cAlan D. Taylor.
246	3		_aSocial Choice & the Mathematics of Manipulation
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2005.
300			_a1 online resource (xi, 176 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aOutlooks
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
520			_aHonesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This 2005 book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system.
650		0	_aVoting _xMathematical models.
650		0	_aSocial choice _xMathematical models.
650		0	_aPolitical science _xMathematical models.
650		0	_aGame theory.
710	2		_aMathematical Association of America, _eissuing body.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9780521810524
830		0	_aOutlooks.
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614316
999			_c516990 _d516988