000			01982nam a22003498i 4500
001			CR9781139107990
003			UkCbUP
005			20200124160330.0
006			m|||||o||d||||||||
007			cr||||||||||||
008			110712s2014||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9781139107990 (ebook)
020			_z9781107020894 (hardback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP
050	0	0	_aBD184 _b.A36 2014
082	0	0	_a122 _223
100	1		_aAhmed, Arif, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aEvidence, decision, and causality / _cArif Ahmed, University of Cambridge.
246	3		_aEvidence, Decision & Causality
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2014.
300			_a1 online resource (ix, 250 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
520			_aMost philosophers agree that causal knowledge is essential to decision-making: agents should choose from the available options those that probably cause the outcomes that they want. This book argues against this theory and in favour of evidential or Bayesian decision theory, which emphasises the symptomatic value of options over their causal role. It examines a variety of settings, including economic theory, quantum mechanics and philosophical thought-experiments, where causal knowledge seems to make a practical difference. The arguments make novel use of machinery from other areas of philosophical inquiry, including first-person epistemology and the free will debate. The book also illustrates the applicability of decision theory itself to questions about the direction of time and the special epistemic status of agents.
650		0	_aDecision making.
650		0	_aEvidence.
650		0	_aCausation.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781107020894
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139107990
999			_c522529 _d522527