000			02120nam a22003378i 4500
001			CR9781316178843
003			UkCbUP
005			20200124160335.0
006			m|||||o||d||||||||
007			cr||||||||||||
008			140828s2017||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9781316178843 (ebook)
020			_z9781107100336 (hardback)
020			_z9781107495906 (paperback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP
050	0	0	_aHG8026 _b.T46 2017
082	0	0	_a368 _223
100	1		_aThomas, Guy _q(R. Guy), _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aLoss coverage : _bwhy insurance works better with some adverse selection / _cGuy Thomas, University of Kent.
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2017.
300			_a1 online resource (ix, 274 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 12 May 2017).
520			_aMost academic and policy commentary represents adverse selection as a severe problem in insurance, which should always be deprecated, avoided or minimised. This book gives a contrary view. It details the exaggeration of adverse selection in insurers' rhetoric and insurance economics, and presents evidence that in many insurance markets, adverse selection is weaker than most commentators suggest. A novel arithmetical argument shows that from a public policy perspective, 'weak' adverse selection can be a good thing. This is because a degree of adverse selection is needed to maximise 'loss coverage', the expected fraction of the population's losses which is compensated by insurance. This book will be valuable for those interested in public policy arguments about insurance and discrimination: academics (in economics, law and social policy), policymakers, actuaries, underwriters, disability activists, geneticists and other medical professionals.
650		0	_aInsurance _xSocial aspects.
650		0	_aRisk.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781107100336
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316178843
999			_c522993 _d522991