National Science Library of Georgia

Image from Google Jackets

The Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Kantian Perspective / Anna Tomaszewska.

By: Material type: TextTextLanguage: English Publisher: Warsaw ; Berlin : De Gruyter Open Poland, [2014]Copyright date: ©2014Description: 1 online resourceContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9783110372656
Subject(s): Additional physical formats: No title; No titleDDC classification:
  • 121 23
LOC classification:
  • B2799.K7 T55 2014
Other classification:
  • CF 5017
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1 The Contents of Perceptual Experience: Opposing Views -- 2 Are the Roots of the Debate Kantian? -- 3 Kant on Nonconceptual Content: Sensations and Intuitions -- 4 Kant on Concepts in Experience -- 5 Nonconceptual Content and Transcendental Idealism -- 6 Kant and Naturalism about the Mind -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index
Summary: The book addresses the debate on whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, by bringing out the points of comparison between Kant's conception of intuition and the contemporary accounts of non-conceptual content, encountered in the writings of G. Evans, Ch. Peacocke, F. Dretske, T. Crane, M. G. F. Martin, and others. Following R. Aquila's reading of Kant's conception of representation, the author argues that intuition (Anschauung, intuitus) provides the most basic form of intentionality - pre-conceptual reference to objects, which underlies the acts of conceptualization and judgment.The book advances an interpretation of Kant's theory of experience in the light of such questions as: Does conscious perceptual experience of objects require that subjects possess concepts of these objects? Do the contents of experience differ from the contents of beliefs or judgments? And if they do, what accounts for this difference? These questions take us to the most puzzling philosophical topic of the relation between mind and world. Anna Tomaszewska argues that this relation does not involve conceptual capacities alone but also, on the most basic level of perceptual experience, pre-cognitive "sensible intuition," enabling relatedness to objects that remains uninformed by concepts. In a nutshell, on her interpretation, Kant can be taken to subscribe to the view that perceptual cognition does not have rational underpinnings.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
No physical items for this record

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1 The Contents of Perceptual Experience: Opposing Views -- 2 Are the Roots of the Debate Kantian? -- 3 Kant on Nonconceptual Content: Sensations and Intuitions -- 4 Kant on Concepts in Experience -- 5 Nonconceptual Content and Transcendental Idealism -- 6 Kant and Naturalism about the Mind -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index

Open Access unrestricted online access star

https://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2

The book addresses the debate on whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, by bringing out the points of comparison between Kant's conception of intuition and the contemporary accounts of non-conceptual content, encountered in the writings of G. Evans, Ch. Peacocke, F. Dretske, T. Crane, M. G. F. Martin, and others. Following R. Aquila's reading of Kant's conception of representation, the author argues that intuition (Anschauung, intuitus) provides the most basic form of intentionality - pre-conceptual reference to objects, which underlies the acts of conceptualization and judgment.The book advances an interpretation of Kant's theory of experience in the light of such questions as: Does conscious perceptual experience of objects require that subjects possess concepts of these objects? Do the contents of experience differ from the contents of beliefs or judgments? And if they do, what accounts for this difference? These questions take us to the most puzzling philosophical topic of the relation between mind and world. Anna Tomaszewska argues that this relation does not involve conceptual capacities alone but also, on the most basic level of perceptual experience, pre-cognitive "sensible intuition," enabling relatedness to objects that remains uninformed by concepts. In a nutshell, on her interpretation, Kant can be taken to subscribe to the view that perceptual cognition does not have rational underpinnings.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

This eBook is made available Open Access. Unless otherwise specified individually in the content, the work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC BY-NC-ND) license:

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0

https://www.degruyter.com/dg/page/open-access-policy

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 15. Jun 2019)

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.
Copyright © 2023 Sciencelib.ge All rights reserved.